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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
this trade has been combined with other more serious offenses. In re
Newall, i6o N. Y. S. 275, is such a case. Here the attorneys had a sys-
tem of "runners" to search out victims of railway accidents, the added
offense being that of cheating clients so obtained of all that was justly
due them. The cases show an increasing stringency concerning those
who violate the ethics of the profession which may be attributed to the
growing strength and consciousness of the bar associations throughout
the country.'
The Cannons of Professional Ethics of the various bar associations
have sections devoted to this matter. Appended to many of them is the
following portion from a law lecture delivered by Lincoln: "Never stir
up litigation. A worse man can scarcely be found than one who does
this. Who can be more nearly a fiend than he who habitually overhauls
the register of deeds in search of defects in titles, whereon to stir up
strife and put money in his pocket? A moral tone ought to be infused
into the profession which would drive such men out of it." Nicolay and
Hay's Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. ii, page 142. The register
worms of Lincoln's day have extended the field of their activities. If
Lincoln's admonition was applicable in that period of the profession
called the "Golden Era," it is doubly true today, for now they overhaul
the street, hospitals and homes.
Warvelle, in his Essays in Legal Ethics, pages 56-57, stigmatizes
"ambulance chasing" as a "vile prostitution of the advocate's calling.
It is not law practice; it is simply a form of legalized piracy."
Few attorneys are so endowed with wealth that they can give their
services gratis. Recognizing this a New York court.observed, "The
standard should be raised, rather than lowered, for the age in which we
live is one which is much concerned with money and the things money
will bring. The fact that the lawyer must support himself by his pro-
fessional labors, and that he receives his compensation from a purely
private source, unquestionably has a tendency to commercialize his work
and obscure even from his own mind the fact that his real client is
Justice," In re Newall, 16o N. Y. S. 275, 278.
V. W. D.
Attorney and Client: Kfnowledge of first attorney imputed to
client.-The rule of law that knowledge of an attorney is knowledge
of his client was given a rather rigid application in the recent case of
Farnsworth, v. Hazelett (Iowa, 1924) i99 N. W. 41o. The client in
this case procured the service of the attorney for the purpose of collect-
ing a debt. The attorney made arrangements with a bank whereby the
debtor was to make full payment. Before he had communicated such
knowledge to his client, the client learned that the debtor contemplated
a disposal of some of his property. He immediately "hot-footed" over
to the attorney's home. On arriving there he was informed that the
attorney was seriously ill and in no position to see or talk to anyone.
In his anxiety he immediately consulted another attorney and insisted
that a suit be brought at once. At the trial of the case the defendant put
in a counter-claim for malicious prosecution and recovered judgment.
1 See Note and Comment in next issue of the Review on Hepp v. Petrie, 200
N. W. 857 (Wis.).
NOTES AND COMMENT
The Supreme Court affirmed this judgment stating that there was no
ground for such suit. being brought inasmuch as a settlement had been
arranged between the former attorney and the client and the presump-
tion that knowledge acquired by an attorney is imputed to his client
could not be rebutted by showing that, as a matter of fact, such knowl-
edge was not communicated.
The general rule that a client is bound by the knowledge of his attor-
ney is based upon the principle that it is the attorney's duty to com-
municate to his client the knowledge which he has respecting the
subject-matter and the presumption that he will fulfill that duty.'
The two and only situations in which an attorney is not at liberty to
disclose such information are (i) where such information is confidential
as to former clients and (2) where the attorney is acting in fraud of his
client; for when it is not the attorney's duty to communicate such
knowledge or where it would be unlawful for him to do so, as for ex-
ample where it had been acquired confidentially as attorney for a former
client in a prior transaction, the reason of the rule ceases and in such a
case an attorney is not expected to do that which would be a betrayal
of professional confidence and his client will not be bound by his attor-
ney's confidential information. This exception to the rule had its origin
in England in cases involving large estates where men of great profes-
sional eminence were frequently consulted. In such cases it would be
very mischievous to apply the rule for it would make the most eminent
attorney the most dangerous to employ.
2
Where an attorney acts fraudulently the presumption of communi-
cation is rebutted.3 Just as soon as he forms the purpose of dealing
with his client's property for his own benefit and advantage or for the
benefit and advantage of persons who are opposed in interest, he ceases
in fact to be an attorney acting in good faith for his client, and his
actions thereafter based upon such purpose are deemed to be in fraud of
the right of his client and the presumption that he has disclosed all the
facts that have come to his knowledge no longer prevails.
4
This doctrine of imputed knowledge rests upon one of either two
grounds: (i) Upon the principle of legal entity, or (2) upon the ground
that when a client has consumated a transaction in whole or in part
through an attorney, it is contrary to equity and good conscience that he
should be permitted to avail himself of the attorney's participation with-
out being responsible both for his attorney's knowledge and for his
attorney's acts.5  JOSEPH R. GRENFELL.
Libel and Slander: Words Imputing Crime and Immorality.-
The right protected by the law of defamation is the right of reputation.
Causing damage to the reputation of another may be called a non-
physical tort as distinguished from a physical tort. At common law it
was not actionable per se orally to impute a want of chastity to a woman,
nor orally to impute to her professional or habitual unchastity. The
The Distilled Spirits, ii Wall. (U. S.) 367.
'Norsley ,. Earl of Scarborough, 3 Atkyns 392.
3Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co. 93 Wis. 154.
'Benedict v. Arnoux, 154 N. Y. 715.
5 lrvine v. Grady, 19 S. W. I092.
